

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 MCE-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15  
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 HA-05 AID-05 ACDA-12  
TRSE-00 OMB-01 EB-08 H-01 COME-00 DODE-00 /083 W  
-----012899 211814Z /50

P 211535Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8352  
INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO  
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 5690

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, MASS, BR  
SUBJ: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REFS: (A) STATE 167901, (B) STATE 168320 (C) BRASILIA 5331,  
(D) STATE 182987

1. REFTELS REQUESTED REPORTED DUE JULY 21, 1978, CONSOLIDATING PAST SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT GOB RENOUNCED SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN MARCH 1977 AND ALL MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH US IN SEPTEMBER 1977, AND THAT ITS ELIGIBILITY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE EXPIRES ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1978. POST IS THEREFORE RESPONDING TO THOSE PORTIONS OF REFTELS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION, I.E. IN WHICH THE GOB WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REQUIREING A SECTION 502 (B) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.

2. FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO NUMBERED AND LETTERED SUBJ-PARAGRAPHS UNDER PARA 3A REF A:

(1) BRAZIL'S RENUNCIATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND RELATED MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH THE US IN MARCH AND SEPTEMBER 1977 SHARPLY REDUCED THE SCOPE OF USG-GOB MILITARY COOPERATION.  
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GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE WHICH THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO PLAY IN THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WELL DISPOSED TO THE US CONTINUES TO BE OF IMPORTANCE TO THE PURSUIT OF UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES. LACK OF A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US COULD, IF PERMANENT, SERIOUSLY ERODE THE PRESENT PRO-US ORIENTATION AND GOOD WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY. BEYOND THIS,

THERE IS NO CLEAR CONSENSUS OF WHAT US NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES WOULD BE SERVED BY THE RENEWAL OF A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AT PAST LEVELS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS GENERAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT CONTINUED ACCESS TO US DOCTRINE AND TRAINING WOULD PROMOTE SOME DESIRABLE LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING, COOPERATION AND POSSIBLY SOME STANDARDIZATION AND RATIONALIZATION. WE HAVE URGED FURTHER STUDY BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES OF US NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS BRAZIL. CLEARLY A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SHOULD BE AN INSTRUMENT TO PURSUE THOSE OBJECTIVES.

(2) BRAZILIAN MILITARY LEADERS BELIEVE THAT, IN TERMS OF EAST-WEST CONFLICT, BRAZIL FACES BASICALLY THE SAME EXTERNAL THREAT AS DOES THE US BECAUSE OF ITS FIRM COMMITMENT TO WESTERN WORLD AND ITS GROWING ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. THEY DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY DIRECT THREAT FROM FRONTIER COUNTRIES, BUT STILL BELIEVE BRAZIL TO BE SUBJECT TO POTENTIAL THREAT FROM INTERNAL SUBVERSION FOMENTED BY WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY", EVEN THOUGH FORMERLY ACTIVE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND AT THIS POINT.

(3) WE CONCUR WITH GOB'S ASSESSMENT THAT THERE IS PRESENTLY NO EXTERNAL THREAT TO BRAZIL. WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNAL THREAT WE BELIEVE THE BRAZILIAN DEFINITION OF SUBVERSION IS TOO BROAD, AND TENDS TO ENCOMPASS MANY OF THE MORE RADICAL POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF THE PRESENT REGIME OR OF THE 1964 REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

(4) BRAZIL HAS FACED ITS INTERNAL THREAT SINCE 1964 BY MODERNIZING  
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AND REORGANIZING ITS MILITARY FORCES, WHICH HAD TRADITIONALLY FOCUSED ON POTENTIAL SOUTHERN THREAT, TO COUNTER AN ACTIVE URBAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT DURING 1969-1974 AND TO BETTER MEET THE SECURITY AND CIVIC ACTION REQUIREMENTS OF OPENING NEW TERRITORIES AND SURVEILLANCE OF FRONTIER AREAS. A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE ARMED FORCES RESOURCES, PRIMARILY TECHNICAL SERVICES, IS EXPENDED IN NATION-BUILDING ACTIVITIES IN THE OUTLYING AREAS.

(5) EXCEPT FOR ASW AND SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS, BRAZILIAN FORCES AS PRESENTLY STRUCTURED HAVE ONLY LIMITED CAPABILITY TO COMPLEMENT US FORCES IN THE REGION, EXCEPT FOR COASTAL

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OMB-01 EB-08 H-01 COME-00 MCE-00 DODE-00 /083 W  
-----014438 211814Z /50

P 211535Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8353

INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 5690

AIR AND SEA CONTROL MISSIONS. BRAZIL HAS NO PROJECTION CAPABILITY TO COMPLEMENT US FORCES POTENTIALLY OPERATING IN AFRICA, ALTHOUGH GOB DEFENSE FACILITIES COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE AS BASES FOR PROJECTION OF US FORCES INTO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC BASIN.

(6) ARMED FORCES MODERNIZATION HAS BEEN CONTRAINED SINCE 1973 BECAUSE OF NON-MILITARY PRIORITIES FOR GOB SPENDING.

DEFENSE SPENDING CONSTITUTES LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE BRAZILIAN GNP, MOSTLY FOR FORCE OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE AND SALARIES. LITTLE DEFENSE SPENDING GOES FOR INVESTMENT IN NEW EQUIPMENT. BRAZIL HAS CLEARLY CHOSE SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN GIVING PRIORITY TO DEVELOPMENT OF A SMALL DOMESTIC ARMS INDUSTRY WHICH ALSO IS EXPORTING WEAPONS TO THE THIRD WORLD. BRAZIL'S PAST BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS AND HEAVY DEBT SERVICING REQUIREMTNT ARE UNDOUBTEDLY FACTORS CONSTRAINING ARMED FORCES MODERNAIZATION, BUT THE LACK OF PERCEIVED MILITARY THREAT WEIGHED AGAINST COMPETING DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS GIVES BRAZIL LITTLE REASON TO SPEND ON DEFENSE.

(7) --(10): NOT APPLICABLE

(11) THE BRAZILIAN HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS IMPROVED MARKEDLY OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS. THIS IS OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH HUMANRIGHTS PROPONENTS AND THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN BRAZIL, WHO NOW SEE THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE COUNTRY. IT IS NOT IN THE USG'S INTEREST TO WITHOLD  
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ON A BLANKET BASIS MUNITIONS CONTROL LICENSE FOR MILITARY ITEMS EXPORTED THROUGH COMMERCIAL SALES OF BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES. BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE RETURNED THE POLICE FUNCTION TO THE APPROPRIATE POLICE AUTHORITIES. WHERE ITEMS ARE LICENSED FOR POLICE PURPOSES, ITEMS SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE INTENT FOR THEIR USE.

(12) BRAZIL RECEIVES NO MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.

(13) BRAZIL IS INELIGIBLE FOR PROGRAM COMPONENTS. SHOULD THE GOB ABRUPTLY (AND UNEXPECTEDLY) CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE

SECTION 502 (B) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, THE ONLY COMPONENTS IT WOULD LIKELY PURSUE WOULD BE CASH PURCHASES AND IMET.

(A) LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM): NO FMS PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY PLANNED, BUT APPROXIMATELY \$38 MILLION REMAINS IN THE PIPELINE FROM PREVIOUS YEARS FOR DELIVERY AND FINAL DISPOSITION AFTER EXPIRATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

(B) LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE): -P- (SEE SUB-PARAGRAPH A ABOVE).

(C) LEVEL 3 (CURRENT): -0- (SEE SUB-PARAGRAPH A ABOVE).

(D) INCREMENTAL LEVEL: \$200,000

(E) A SMALL INCREMENTAL IMET PROGRAM WOULD BE A BRIDGE BUILDING EFFORT BETWEEN USG AND GOB FORCES, INTENDED SELECTIVELY TO PROMOTE US INTERESTS IN ADVANCING OUR DOCTRINE OR IN ACHIEVING RATIONALIZATION OR STANDARDIZATION. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM LEVEL WOULD AFFORD THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEND HIGHLY SELECTED OFFICERS TO US MILITARY SERVICE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSES AND WOULD ENABLE THE US TO RECIPROCATATE FOR SPACES CURRENTLY MADE AVAILABLE TO US OFFICERS IN BRAZILIAN COUNTERPART SCHOOLS. ADDITIONALLY, IT WOULD PERMIT APPROXIMATELY 10 BRAZILIAN STUDENTS TO ATTEND MID-CAREER STAFF COURSES AND SENIOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT COURSES IN THE US, AND WOULD PROMOTE US INTERESTS IN TERMS OF ORIENTATION OF AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS  
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WITH PROSPECTIVE MILITARY LEADERS. WE SEE LITTLE RISK THAT THE PROGRAM NEED BE CONTROVERSIAL IN CONGRESS GIVE THE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN BRAZIL OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.

(F) A MINIMUM SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT MANNING LEVEL FOR FINAL DISPOSITION OF FMS PIPELINE FROM PREVIOUS YEARS WOULD CONSIST OF THREE LOGISTICAL OFFICERS (ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE), WITH AN ADMINISTRATIVE NCO. BECAUSE WORKLOAD STATISTICS INDICATE THE NEED FOR AN AVERAGE OF FOUR LOGISTICAL OFFICERS, A MINIMUM OF THREE WOULD RESULT IN UNACCEPTABLE DELAYS IN THE EFFICIENT HANDLING OF THE WORKLOAD. AN INTERMEDIATE MANNING LEVEL WOULD CONSIST OF THE THREE ABOVE-MENTIONED OFFICERS AND ONE NCO PLUS AN AIR FORCE OR NAVY COMMANDING OFFICER (REF C). THIS LEVEL WOULD NOT NECESSITATE ANY INCREASE IN US STAFFING OVER THE CURRENT LEVEL.

(G) NOT APPLICABLE.

(H) ASSEE (E) ABOVE FOR DESCRIPTION OF SCOPE OF PROPOSED IMET PROGRAM. IN ABSENCE OF FMS PROGRAM, IMET IS PROPOSED BECAUSE INDIGENOUS OF THIRD-COUNTRY TRAINING WOULD NOT PROMOTE US INTEREST IN JOINT MILITARY COOPERATION, RATIONALIZATION, AND STANDARDIZATION.

(I) IT IS ESTIMATED THAT FINAL DISPOSITION OF BULK PIPELINE WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS. UNLESS MAJOR POLICY SHIFT REGARDING JOINT MILITARY COOPERATION TAKES PLACE DURING THIS PERIOD, NO PROGRAM WHATSOEVER IS ANTICIPATED

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## Message Attributes

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